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Abstract
Predicting the development of articial intelligence (AI) is a dicult
project { but a vital one, according to some analysts. AI predictions al-
ready abound: but are they reliable? This paper will start by proposing a
decomposition schema for classifying them. Then it constructs a variety of
theoretical tools for analysing, judging and improving them. These tools
are demonstrated by careful analysis of ve famous AI predictions: the
initial Dartmouth conference, Dreyfus's criticism of AI, Searle's Chinese
Room paper, Kurzweil's predictions in the `Age of Spiritual Machines',
and Omohundro's `AI Drives' paper. These case studies illustrate several
important principles, such as the general overcondence of experts, the
superiority of models over expert judgement, and the need for greater
uncertainty in all types of predictions. The general reliability of expert
judgement in AI timeline predictions is shown to be poor, a result that
ts in with previous studies of expert competence.// Keywords:AI, pre-
dictions, experts, bias, case studies, expert judgement, falsication
1 Introduction
Predictions about the future development of articial intelligence (AI1) are as
condent as they are diverse. Starting with Turing's initial estimation of a
30% pass rate on Turing test by the year 2000 [Tur50], computer scientists,
philosophers and journalists have never been shy to oer their own denite
prognostics, claiming AI to be impossible [Jac87], just around the corner [Dar70]
or anything in between.
What should one think of this breadth and diversity of predictions? Can
anything of value be extracted from them, or are they to be seen as mere enter-
tainment or opinion? The question is an important one, because true AI would
have a completely transformative impact on human society { and many have
argued that it could be extremely dangerous [Yam12, Yud08, Min84]. Those ar-
guments are predictions in themselves, so an assessment of predictive reliability
in the AI eld is a very important project. It is in humanity's interest to know if
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1AI here is used in the old fashioned sense of a machine capable of human-comparable
cognitive performance; a less ambiguous modern term would be `AGI', Articial General
Intelligence.
1these risks are reasonable, and, if so, when and how AI is likely to be developed.
Even if the risks turn out to be overblown, simply knowing the reliability of
general AI predictions will have great social and economic consequences.
The aim of this paper is thus to construct a framework and tools of analysis
that allow for the assessment of predictions, of their quality and of their uncer-
tainties. Though specically aimed at AI, these methods can be used to assess
predictions in other contentious and uncertain elds.
This paper rst proposes a classication scheme for predictions, dividing
them into four broad categories and analysing what types of arguments are
used (implicitly or explicitly) to back them up. Dierent prediction types and
methods result in very dierent performances, and it is critical to understand
this varying reliability. To do so, this paper will build a series of tools that can
be used to clarify a prediction, reveal its hidden assumptions, and making use
of empirical evidence whenever possible.
Since expert judgement is such a strong component of most predictions, as-
sessing the reliability of this judgement is a key component. Previous studies
have isolated the task characteristics in which experts tend to have good judge-
ment { and the results of that literature strongly imply that AI predictions are
likely to be very unreliable, at least as far as timeline predictions (`date until
AI') are concerned. That theoretical result is born out in practice: timeline
predictions are all over the map, with no pattern of convergence, and no vis-
ible dierence between expert and non-expert predictions. These results were
detailed in a previous paper [AS12], and are summarised here.
The key part of the paper is a series of case studies on ve of the most
famous AI predictions: the initial Dartmouth conference, Dreyfus's criticism of
AI, Searle's Chinese Room paper, Kurzweil's predictions in the `Age of Spiritual
Machines', and Omohundro's AI Drives. Each prediction is analysed in detail,
using the methods developed earlier. The Dartmouth conference proposal was
surprisingly good { despite being wildly inaccurate, it would have seemed to
be the most reliable estimate at the time. Dreyfus's work was very prescient,
despite his outsider status, and could have inuenced AI development for the
better { had it not been so antagonistic to those in the eld. Some predictions
could be extracted even from Searle's non-predictive Chinese room thought
experiment, mostly criticisms of the AI work of his time. Kurzweil's predictions
were tested with volunteer assessors, and we shown to be surprisingly good {
but his self-assessment was very inaccurate, throwing some doubt on his later
predictions. Finally Omohundro's predictions were shown to be much better as
warning for what could happen to general AIs, than as emphatic statements of
what would necessarily happen2.
The key lessons learned are of the general overcondence of experts, the pos-
sibility of deriving testable predictions from even the most theoretical of papers,
the superiority of model-based over judgement-based predictions, and the great
diculty in assessing the reliability of predictors { by all reasonable measures,
the Dartmouth conference predictions should have been much more reliable that
Dreyfus's outside predictions, and yet reality was completely opposite.
2The predictions also fared very well as a ideal simplied model of AI to form a basis for
other predictive work.
22 Taxonomy of predictions
2.1 Prediction types
There will never be a bigger plane built.
Boeing engineer on the 247, a twin engine plane that held ten people.
A fortune teller talking about celebrity couples, a scientist predicting the
outcome of an experiment, an economist pronouncing on next year's GDP g-
ures { these are canonical examples of predictions. There are other types of
predictions, though. Conditional statements { if X happens, then so will Y {
are also valid, narrower, predictions. Impossibility results are also a form of
prediction. For instance, the law of conservation of energy gives a very broad
prediction about every single perpetual machine ever made: to wit, that they
will never work.
The common thread is that all these predictions constrain expectations of
the future. If one takes the prediction to be true, one expects to see dierent
outcomes than if one takes it to be false. This is closely related to Popper's
notion of falsiability [Pop34]. This paper will take every falsiable statement
about future AI to be a prediction.
For the present analysis, predictions about AI will be divided into four types:
1. Timelines and outcome predictions. These are the traditional types of
predictions, giving the dates of specic AI milestones. Examples: An AI
will pass the Turing test by 2000 [Tur50]; Within a decade, AIs will be
replacing scientists and other thinking professions [Hal11].
2. Scenarios. These are a type of conditional predictions, claiming that if
the conditions of the scenario are met, then certain types of outcomes will
follow. Example: If someone builds a human-level AI that is easy to copy
and cheap to run, this will cause mass unemployment among ordinary
humans [Han94].
3. Plans. These are a specic type of conditional prediction, claiming that if
someone decides to implement a specic plan, then they will be successful
in achieving a particular goal. Example: AI can be built by scanning a
human brain and simulating the scan on a computer [San08].
4. Issues and metastatements. This category covers relevant problems with
(some or all) approaches to AI (including sheer impossibility results),
and metastatements about the whole eld. Examples: an AI cannot be
built without a fundamental new understanding of epistemology [Deu12];
Generic AIs will have certain (potentially dangerous) behaviours [Omo08].
There will inevitably be some overlap between the categories, but the division
is natural enough for this paper.
2.2 Prediction methods
Just as there are many types of predictions, there are many ways of arriving
at them { crystal balls, consulting experts, constructing elaborate models. An
3initial review of various AI predictions throughout the literature suggests the
following loose schema for prediction methods3:
1. Causal models
2. Non-causal models
3. The outside view
4. Philosophical arguments
5. Expert judgement
6. Non-expert judgement
Causal model are a staple of physics and the harder sciences: given certain
facts about the situation under consideration (momentum, energy, charge, etc.)
a conclusion is reached about what the ultimate state will be. If the facts were
dierent, the end situation would be dierent.
Outside of the hard sciences, however, causal models are often a luxury, as
the underlying causes are not well understood. Some success can be achieved
with non-causal models: without understanding what inuences what, one can
extrapolate trends into the future. Moore's law's law is a highly successful
non-causal model [Moo65].
In the the outside view, specic examples are grouped together and claimed
to be examples of the same underlying trend. This trend is used to give further
predictions. For instance, one could notice the many analogues of Moore's law
across the spectrum of computing (e.g. in numbers of transistors, size of hard
drives, network capacity, pixels per dollar), note that AI is in the same category,
and hence argue that AI development must follow a similarly exponential curve
[Kur99]. Note that the use of the outside view is often implicit rather than
explicit: rarely is it justied why these examples are grouped together, beyond
general plausibility or similarity arguments. Hence detecting uses of the outside
view will be part of the task of revealing hidden assumptions (see Section 3.2).
There is evidence that the use of the outside view provides improved prediction
accuracy, at least in some domains [KL93].
Philosophical arguments are common in the eld of AI. Some are simple
impossibility statements: AI is decreed to be impossible, using arguments of
varying plausibility. More thoughtful philosophical arguments highlight prob-
lems that need to be resolved in order to achieve AI, interesting approaches for
doing so, and potential issues that might emerge if AIs were to built.
Many of the predictions made by AI experts aren't logically complete: not
every premise is unarguable, not every deduction is fully rigorous. In many
cases, the argument relies on the expert's judgement to bridge these gaps. This
doesn't mean that the prediction is unreliable: in a eld as challenging as AI,
judgement, honed by years of related work, may be the best tool available.
Non-experts cannot easily develop a good feel for the eld and its subtleties, so
should not condently reject expert judgement out of hand. Relying on expert
judgement has its pitfalls, however, as will be seen in Sections 3.4 and 4.
3As with any such schema, the purpose is to bring clarity to the analysis, not to force every
prediction into a particular box, so it should not be seen as the denitive decomposition of
prediction methods.
4Finally, some predictions rely on the judgement of non-experts, or of experts
making claims outside their domain of expertise. Prominent journalists, authors,
CEO's, historians, physicists and mathematicians will generally be no more
accurate than anyone else when talking about AI, no matter how stellar they
are in their own eld [Kah11].
Predictions often use a combination of these methods. For instance, Ray
Kurzweil's `Law of Time and Chaos' uses the outside view to group together
evolutionary development, technological development, and computing into the
same category, and constructs a causal model predicting time to the `Singularity'
[Kur99] (see Section 5.4). Moore's law (non-causal model) is a key input to this
Law, and Ray Kurzweil's expertise is the Law's main support (see Section 5.4).
The case studies of Section 5 have examples of all of these prediction meth-
ods.
3 A toolbox of assessment methods
The purpose of this paper is not simply to assess the accuracy and reliability
of past AI predictions. Rather, the aim is to build a `toolbox' of methods that
can be used to assess future predictions, both within and outside the eld of
AI. The most important features of the toolbox are ways of extracting falsiable
predictions, ways of clarifying and revealing assumptions, ways of making use of
empirical evidence when possible, and ways of assessing the reliability of expert
judgement.
3.1 Extracting falsiable predictions
As stated in Section 2.1, predictions are taken to be falsiable/veriable state-
ments about the future of AI4. Thus is very important to put the predictions
into this format. Sometimes they already are, but at other times it isn't so
obvious: then the falsiable piece must be clearly extracted and articulated.
Sometimes it is ambiguity that must be overcome: when an author predicts an
AI \Omega point" in 2040 [Sch06], it is necessary to read the paper with care
to gure out what counts as an Omega point and (even more importantly) what
doesn't.
At the extreme, some philosophical arguments { such as the Chinese Room
argument [Sea80] { are often taken to have no falsiable predictions whatso-
ever. They are seen as simply being thought experiment establishing a purely
philosophical point. Predictions can often be extracted from even the most
philosophical of arguments, however { or, if not the argument itself, then from
the intuitions justifying the argument. Section 5.3 demonstrates how the intu-
itions behind the Chinese Room argument can lead to testable predictions.
Note that the authors of the arguments may disagree with the `extracted'
predictions. This is not necessarily a game breaker. The aim should always
be to try to create useful veriable predictions when possible, thus opening
more of the extensive AI philosophical literature for predictive purposes. For
instance, Lucas argues that AI is impossible because it could not recognise the
4This is a choice of focus for the paper, not a logical positivist argument that only empir-
ically veriable predictions have meaning [Car28].
5truth of its own G odel sentence5[Luc61]. This is a very strong conclusion, and is
dependent on Lucas's expert judgement; nor is it clear how it can be tested, as it
doesn't put any limits on the performance and capability of intelligent machines.
The intuition behind it, however, seems to be that G odel-like sentences pose
real problems to the building of an AI, and hence one can extract the weaker
empirical prediction: \Self-reference will be a problem with advanced AIs".
Care must be taken when applying this method: the point is to extract a
useful falsiable prediction, not to weaken or strengthen a reviled or favoured
argument. The very rst stratagems in Schopenhauer's \The Art of Always
being Right" [Sch31] are to extend and over-generalise the consequences of ones
opponent's argument; conversely, one should reduce and narrow down one's own
arguments. There is no lack of rhetorical tricks to uphold one's own position,
but if one is truly after the truth, one must simply attempt to nd the most
reasonable falsiable version of the argument; the truth-testing will come later.
This method often increases the prediction's uncertainty, in that it makes the
prediction less restrictive (and less powerful) than it rst seemed. For instance,
Bruce Edmonds [Edm09], building on the \No Free Lunch" results [WM95],
demonstrates that there is no such thing as a universal intelligence: no intel-
ligence that outperforms others in every circumstance. Initially this seems to
rule out AI entirely; but when one analyses what this means empirically, one
realises there is far less to it. It does not forbid an algorithm from performing
better than any human being in any situation any human being would ever
encounter, for instance. So the initial impression, which was that the argument
ruled out all futures with AIs in them, is now replaced by the realisation that
the argument has barely put any constraints on the future at all.
3.2 Clarifying and revealing assumptions
The previous section was concerned with the prediction's conclusions. This
section will instead be looking at its assumptions, and the logical structure of
the argument or model behind it. The objective is to make the prediction as
rigorous as possible. This kind of task has been a staple of philosophy ever since
the dialectic [PlaBC].
Of critical importance is revealing hidden assumptions that went into the
predictions. These hidden assumptions { sometimes called Enthymematic gaps
in the literature [Fal03] { are very important because they clarify where the true
disagreements lie, and where the investigation needs to be focused to gure out
the truth of the prediction. Too often, competing experts will make broad-based
arguments that y past each other. This makes choosing the right argument
a matter of taste, prior opinions and admiration of the experts involved. If
the argument can be correctly deconstructed, however, then the source of the
disagreement can be isolated, and the issue can be decided on much narrower
grounds { and it's much clearer whether the various experts have relevant ex-
pertise or not (see Section 3.4). The hidden assumptions are often implicit, so
it is perfectly permissible to construct assumptions that the predictors were not
consciously aware of using. The purpose is not to score points for one `side'
5A G odel sentence is a sentence G that can be built in any formal system containing
arithmetic. G is implicitly self-referential, as it is equivalent with \there cannot exist a proof
of G". By construction, there cannot be a consistent proof of G from within the system.
6or the other, but always to clarify and analyse arguments and to nd the true
points of disagreement.
For illustration of the method, consider again the G odel arguments men-
tioned in the Section 3.1. The argument shows that formal systems of a certain
complexity must be either incomplete (unable to see that their G odel sentence
is true) or inconsistent (proving false statements). This is contrasted with hu-
mans, who { allegedly { use meta-reasoning to know that their own G odel
statements are true. Also, humans are both inconsistent and able to deal with
inconsistencies without a complete collapse of logic6. However neither humans
nor AIs are logically omniscient { they are not capable of instantly proving
everything provable within their logic system. So this analysis demonstrates
the hidden assumption in Lucas's argument: that the behaviour of an actual
computer program running on a real machine is more akin to that of a logically
omniscient formal agent, than to a real human being. That assumption may be
awed or correct, but is one of the real sources of disagreement over whether
G odelian arguments rule out articial intelligence.
There is surprisingly little published on the proper way of clarifying assump-
tions, making this approach more an art than a science. If the prediction comes
from a model, there are some standard tools available for clarication [MH90].
Most of these methods work by varying parameters in the model and checking
that this doesn't cause a breakdown in the prediction. This is more a check of
robustness of the model than of its accuracy, however.
3.2.1 Model testing and counterfactual resiliency
Causal models can be tested by analysing their assumptions. Non-causal models
are much harder to test: what are the assumptions behind Moore's famous law
[Moo65], or Robin Hanson's model that humanity is due for another techno-
logical revolution, based on the timeline of previous revolutions [Han08]? They
both assume that a particular pattern will continue into the future, but why
should this be the case? What grounds (apart from personal taste) does anyone
have to endorse or reject them?
The authors of this paper have come up with a putative way of testing
the assumptions of such models. It involves giving the model a counterfactual
resiliency check: imagining that world history had happened slightly dierently,
and checking whether the model would have been true in those circumstances.
The purpose is to set up a tension between what the model says, and known
(or believed) facts about the world. This will either refute the model, refute the
believed facts, or reveal implicit assumptions the model is making.
To illustrate, consider Robin Hanson's model. The model posits that human-
ity has gone through a series of radical transformations (in brain size, hunting,
agriculture, industry), and that these form a pattern that can be used to pre-
dict the arrival date and speed of the next revolution, which is argued to be
an AI revolution7. This is a major use of the outside view, and it implicitly
implies that most things in human historical development are unimportant in
comparison with these revolutions. A counterfactual resiliency test can be car-
ried out: within the standard understanding of history, it seems very plausible
6In this, they tend to dier from AI systems, though some logic systems such as relevance
logic do mimic the same behaviour [RM76].
7Or at least a revolution in `emulations', articial copies of human brains.
7that these revolutions could have happened at very dierent times and paces.
Humanity could have been conned to certain geographical locations by climate
or geographical factors, thus changing the dates of the hunting and agricultural
revolution. The industrial revolutions could have plausibly started earlier with
the ancient Greeks (where it would likely have been slower), or at a later date,
had Europe been deprived of large coal reserves. Finally, if AI were possible, it
certainly seems that contingent facts about modern society could make it much
easier or much harder to reach8. Thus the model seems to be in contradic-
tion with standard understanding of social and technological development, or
dependent on contingent factors to a much larger extent than it seemed.
In contrast, Moore's law seems much more counterfactually resilient: as-
suming that the current technological civilization endured, it's hard to nd any
reliable ways of breaking the law. One can argue plausibly that the free market
is needed for Moore's law to work9; if that's the case, this method has detected
an extra hidden assumption of the model. This method is new, and will cer-
tainly be rened in future. Again, the purpose of the method is not to rule out
certain models, but to nd the nodes of disagreement. In this paper, it is used
in analysing Kurzweil's prediction in section 5.4.
3.2.2 More uncertainty
Clarifying assumptions often ends up weakening the model, and hence increasing
uncertainty (more possible futures are compatible with the model than was
thought). Revealing hidden assumptions has the same eect: the model now
has nothing to say in those futures where the assumptions turn out to be wrong.
Thus the uncertainty will generally go up for arguments treated in this fashion.
In counterpart, of course, the modied prediction is more likely to be true.
3.3 Empirical evidence and the scientic method
The gold standard in separating true predictions from false ones must always
be empirical evidence. The scientic method has proved to be the best way
of disproving false hypotheses, and should be used whenever possible, always
preferred over expert opinion or unjustied models.
Empirical evidence is generally lacking in the AI prediction eld, however.
Since AI predictions concern the existence and properties of a machine that
hasn't yet been built, and for which detailed plans do not exist, there is little
opportunity for the hypothesis-prediction-testing cycle. This should indicate
the great challenges in the eld, with AI predictions being considered more
uncertain than those of even the `softest' sciences, which have access to some
form of empirical evidence.
Some AI predictions approximate the scientic method better than others.
The whole brain emulations model, for instance, makes testable predictions
about the near and medium future [San08]. Moore's law is a prediction backed
up by a lot of scientic evidence, and connected to some extent with AI. Many
8A fuller analysis can be found at http://lesswrong.com/lw/ea8/counterfactual_
resiliency_test_for_noncausal.
9Some have argued, for instance, that the USSR's computers didn't follow Moore's law
http://www.paralogos.com/DeadSuper/Soviet/. What is more certain, is that Russian com-
puters fell far behind the development of their western counterparts.
8predictors (e.g. Kurzweil) make partial predictions on the road towards AI;
these can and should be assessed as evidence of the expert's general predictive
success. Though not always possible, eorts should be made to connect general
predictions with some near-term empirical evidence.
3.4 The reliability of expert judgement
Reliance on experts is nearly unavoidable in AI prediction. Timeline predictions
are often explicitly based on experts' judgement10. Plans also need experts to
come up with them and judge their credibility. So unless every philosopher
agrees on the correctness of a particular philosophical argument, one is depen-
dent to some degree on the philosophical judgement of the author.
Using all the methods of the previous section, one can rene and caveat a
prediction, nd the nodes of disagreement, back it up with empirical evidence
whenever possible, and thus clearly highlight the points where one needs to rely
on expert opinion.
What performance should then be expected from the experts? There have
been several projects over the last few decades looking into expert performance
[Sha92, KK09]. The main result is that it is mainly the nature of the task that
determines the quality of expert performance, rather than other factors. Table
1, reproduced from Shanteau's paper, lists the characteristics that lead to good
or poor expert performance:
Good performance: Poor performance:
Static stimuli Dynamic (changeable) stimuli
Decisions about things Decisions about behaviour
Experts agree on stimuli Experts disagree on stimuli
More predictable problems Less predictable problems
Some errors expected Few errors expected
Repetitive tasks Unique tasks
Feedback available Feedback unavailable
Objective analysis available Subjective analysis only
Problem decomposable Problem not decomposable
Decision aids common Decision aids rare
Table 1: Table of task properties conducive to good and poor expert perfor-
mance.
Not all of these are directly applicable to the current paper, and hence won't
be explained in detail. One very important factor is whether experts get feed-
back, preferably immediately. When feedback is unavailable or delayed, or the
environment isn't one that give good feedback, then expert performance drops
precipitously [KK09, Kah11]. Generally AI predictions have little possibility
10Consider an expert who says that AI will arrive when computer reach a particular level of
ability, and uses Moore's law to nd the date. Though Moore's law is a factor in the argument,
one still has to trust the expert's opinion that that particular level of computational ability
will truly lead to AI { the expert's judgement is crucial.
9for any feedback from empirical data (see Section 3.3), especially not rapid
feedback.
The task characteristics of Table 1 apply to both the overall domain and
the specic task. Though AI prediction is strongly in the right column, any
individual expert can improve their performance by moving their approach into
the left column { for instance by decomposing the problem as much as possible.
Where experts fail, better results can often be achieved by asking the experts
to design a simple algorithmic model and then using the model for predictions
[GZL+00]. Thus the best types of predictions are probably those coming from
well decomposed models.
Expert disagreement is a major problem in making use of their judgement.
If experts in the same eld disagree, objective criteria are needed to gure out
which group is correct11. If experts in dierent elds disagree, objective criteria
are needed to gure out which elds is the most relevant. Personal judgement
cannot be used, as there is no evidence that people are skilled at reliably choosing
between competing experts.
Apart from the characteristics in Table 1, one example of objective crite-
ria is a good prediction track record on the part of the expert. A willingness
to make falsiable, non-ambiguous predictions is another good sign. A better
connection with empirical knowledge and less theoretical rigidity are also posi-
tive indications [Tet05]. It must be noted, however, that assessing whether the
expert possess these characteristics is a second order phenomena { subjective
impressions of the expert's subjective judgement { so in most cases it will be
impossible to identify the truth when there is strong expert disagreement.
3.4.1 Grind versus Insight
There is a distinction between achievements that require grind, versus those
that require insight12. Grind is a term encompassing the application of hard
work and resources to a problem, with the condence that these will accomplish
the goal. Problems that require insight, however, can't simply be solved by hard
work: new, unexpected ideas are needed to reach the goal. Most Moore's law
predictions assume that grind is all that's needed for AI: once a certain level of
computer performance is reached, people will be able to develop AI. In contrast,
some insist that new insights are needed13 [Deu12].
In general, the grind needed for some goal can be predicted quite well.
Project managers and various leaders are often quite good at estimating the
length of projects (as long as they're not directly involved in the project [BGR94]).
Moore's law could be taken as an ultimate example of grind: the global eorts
of many engineers across many elds averages out to a relatively predictable
exponential growth.
Predicting insight is much harder. The Riemann hypothesis is a well-established
mathematical hypothesis from 1885, still unsolved but much researched [Rie59].
How would one go about predicting when it will be solved? If building a true AI
11If one point of view is a small minority, one can most likely reject it as being a error by a
fringe group; but this is not possible if each point of view has a non-negligible group behind
it.
12There are no current publications using this concept exactly, though it is related to some
of the discussion about dierent patterns of discovery in [AS08].
13As with many things in philosophy, this is not a sharp binary distinction, but one of
degree.
10is akin in diculty to solving the Riemann hypothesis (or solving several open
mathematical problems), then timeline predictions are a lot less reliable, with
much larger error bars.
This doesn't mean that a prediction informed by a model of grind is more
accurate than one that models insight. This is only true if a good case is made
that AI can indeed be achieved through grind, and that insight is not needed.
The predictions around whole brain emulations [San08], are one of the few that
make this case convincingly.
3.4.2 Non-expert judgement
All the issues and problems with expert judgement apply just as well to non-
experts. While experts could be expected to have some source of useful insight
due to their training, knowledge and experience, this is not the case with non-
experts, giving no reason to trust their judgement. That is not to say that non-
experts cannot come up with good models, convincing timelines, or interesting
plans and scenarios. It just means that any assessment of the quality of the
prediction depends only on the prediction itself; a non-expert cannot be granted
any leeway to cover up a weak premise or a faulty logical step.
One must beware the halo eect in assessing predictions [Tho20, FASJ00].
This denotes the psychological tendency to see dierent measures of personal
quality to be correlated: an attractive person is seen as likely being intelligent,
someone skilled in one domain is believed to be skilled in another. Hence it is
hard to prevent one's opinion of the predictor from aecting one's assessment of
the prediction, even when this is unwarranted. One should thus ideally assess
non-expert predictions blind, without knowing who the author is. If this is
not possible, one can attempt to reduce the bias by imagining the prediction
was authored by someone else { such as the Archbishop of Canterbury, Warren
Buet or the Unabomber. Success is achieved when hypothetical changes in
authorship do not aect estimations of the validity of the prediction.
4 Timeline predictions
Jonathan Wang and Brian Potter of the Machine Intelligence Research Institute
performed an exhaustive search of the online literature and from this assembled
a database of 257 AI predictions from the period 1950-2012. Of these, 95 con-
tained predictions giving timelines for AI development14.
Table 1 suggests that one should expect AI timeline predictions to be of
relatively low quality. The only unambiguously positive feature of timeline
predictions on that table is that prediction errors are expected and allowed:
apart from that, the task characteristics are daunting, especially on the key
issue of feedback.
The theory is born out in practice: the AI predictions in the database seem
little better than random guesses (see Figure 1). The data is analysed more
thoroughly in a previous paper, which explains the methodology for choosing a
single median estimate [AS12]. The main conclusions are:
14The data can be found at http://www.neweuropeancentury.org/SIAI-FHI_AI_
predictions.xls.
11Figure 1: Median estimate for human-level AI, graphed against date of predic-
tion.
1. There is little correlation between dierent predictions. They span a large
range (the graph has been reduced; there were predictions beyond 2100),
and exhibit no signs of convergence. Ignoring the prediction beyond 2100,
the prediction show a standard deviation of over a quarter century (26
years). There is little to distinguish failed predictions whose date has
passed, from those that still lie in the future.
2. There is no evidence that expert predictions dier from those of non-
experts. Again ignoring predictions beyond 2100, expert predictions show
a standard deviation of 26 years, while non-expert predictions show a
standard deviation of 27 years15.
3. There is no evidence for the so-called Maes-Garreau law16, which is the
idea that predictors preferentially predict AI to be developed just in time
to save them from death.
4. There is a strong tendency to predict the development of AI within 15-25
years from when the prediction is made (over a third of all predictions
are in this timeframe, see Figure 2). Experts, non-experts, and failed
predictions all exhibit this same pattern.
In summary, there are strong theoretical and practical reasons to believe
that timeline AI predictions are likely unreliable.
15Though there is some suggestion that self-selected experts who publish their predictions
have dierent opinions from the mainstream of their elds. A single datapoint in favour of
this theory can be found at: http://lesswrong.com/r/discussion/lw/gta/selfassessment_
in_expert_ai_predictions/, using [Mic73].
16Kevin Kelly, editor of Wired magazine, created the law in 2007 after being inuenced by
Pattie Maes at MIT and Joel Garreau (author of Radical Evolution).
12Figure 2: Time between the arrival of AI and the date the prediction was made.
Years on the x axis, number of predictions on the y axis.
5 Case studies
This section applies and illustrates the schemas of Section 2 and the methods
of Section 3. It does so by looking at ve prominent AI predictions: the initial
Dartmouth conference, Dreyfus's criticism of AI, Searle's Chinese Room paper,
Kurzweil's predictions, and Omohundro's AI Drives. The aim is to assess and
analyse these predictions and gain insights that can then be applied to assessing
future predictions.
5.1 In the beginning, Dartmouth created the AI and the
hype...
Classication: plan, using expert judgement and the outside view.
Hindsight bias is very strong and misleading [Fis75]. Humans are often con-
vinced that past events couldn't have unfolded dierently than how they did,
and that the people at the time should have realised this. Even worse, people
unconsciously edit their own memories so that they misremember themselves as
being right even when they got their past predictions wrong17. Hence when as-
sessing past predictions, one must cast aside all knowledge of subsequent events,
and try to assess the claims given the knowledge available at the time. This
is an invaluable exercise to undertake before turning attention to predictions
whose timelines have not come to pass.
17One of the reasons that it is important to pay attention only to the actual prediction as
written at the time, and not to the author's subsequent justications or clarications.
13The 1956 Dartmouth Summer Research Project on Articial Intelligence was
a major conference, credited with introducing the term \Articial Intelligence"
and starting the research in many of its dierent subelds. The conference pro-
posal18, written in 1955, sets out what the organisers thought could be achieved.
Its rst paragraph reads:
\We propose that a 2 month, 10 man study of articial intelligence
be carried out during the summer of 1956 at Dartmouth College in
Hanover, New Hampshire. The study is to proceed on the basis of
the conjecture that every aspect of learning or any other feature of
intelligence can in principle be so precisely described that a machine
can be made to simulate it. An attempt will be made to nd how to
make machines use language, form abstractions and concepts, solve
kinds of problems now reserved for humans, and improve themselves.
We think that a signicant advance can be made in one or more of
these problems if a carefully selected group of scientists work on it
together for a summer."
This can be classied as a plan. Its main backing would have been expert
judgement. The conference organisers were John McCarthy (a mathematician
with experience in the mathematical nature of the thought process), Marvin
Minsky (Harvard Junior Fellow in Mathematics and Neurology, and prolic user
of neural nets), Nathaniel Rochester (Manager of Information Research, IBM,
designer of the IBM 701, the rst general purpose, mass-produced computer,
and designer of the rst symbolic assembler) and Claude Shannon (the \father
of information theory"). These were individuals who had been involved in a lot
of related theoretical and practical work, some of whom had built functioning
computers or programing languages { so one can expect them all to have had
direct feedback about what was and wasn't doable in computing. If anyone
could be considered experts in AI, in a eld dedicated to an as yet non-existent
machine, then they could. What implicit and explicit assumptions could they
have used to predict that AI would be easy?
Reading the full proposal doesn't give the impression of excessive optimism
or overcondence. The very rst paragraph hints at the rigour of their ambi-
tions { they realised that precisely describing the features of intelligence is a
major step in simulating it. Their research plan is well decomposed, and dif-
ferent aspects of the problem of articial intelligence are touched upon. The
authors are well aware of the ineciency of exhaustive search methods, of the
dierences between informal and formal languages, and of the need for encod-
ing creativity. They talk about the need to design machines that can work with
unreliable components, and that can cope with randomness and small errors in
a robust way. They propose some simple models of some of these challenges
(such as forming abstractions, or dealing with more complex environments),
point to some previous successful work that has been done before, and outline
how further improvements can be made.
Reading through, the implicit reasons for their condence seem to become
apparent19. These were experts, some of whom had been working with comput-
ers from early days, who had a long track record of taking complex problems,
18Available online at http://www-formal.stanford.edu/jmc/history/dartmouth/
dartmouth.html.
19As with any exercise in trying to identify implicit assumptions, this process is somewhat
14creating simple (and then more complicated) models to deal with them. These
models they used to generate useful insights or functioning machines. So this
was an implicit use of the outside view { they were used to solving certain prob-
lems, these looked like the problems they could solve, hence they assumed they
could solve them. To modern eyes, informal languages are hugely complicated,
but this may not have been obvious at the time. Computers were doing tasks,
such as complicated mathematical manipulations, that were considered high-
skill, something only very impressive humans had been capable of20. Moravec's
paradox21 had not yet been realised. The human intuition about the relative
diculty of tasks was taken as accurate: there was no reason to suspect that
parsing English was much harder than the impressive feats computer could al-
ready perform. Moreover, great progress had been made in logic, in semantics,
in information theory, giving new understanding to old concepts: there was
no reason to suspect that further progress wouldn't be both forthcoming and
dramatic.
Even at the time, though, one could criticise their overcondence. Philoso-
phers, for one, had a long track record of pointing out the complexities and
subtleties of the human mind. It might have seemed plausible in 1955 that
further progress in logic and information theory would end up solving all these
problems { but it could have been equally plausible to suppose that the suc-
cess of formal models had been on low-hanging fruit, and that further progress
would become much harder. Furthermore, the computers at the time were much
simpler than the human brain (e.g. the IBM 701, with 73728 bits of memory),
so any assumption that AIs could be built was also an assumption that most
of the human brain's processing was wasted. This implicit assumption was not
obviously wrong, but neither was it obviously right.
Hence the whole conference project would have seemed ideal, had it merely
added more humility and qualiers in the text, expressing uncertainty as to
whether a particular aspect of the program might turn out to be hard or easy.
After all, in 1955, there were no solid grounds for arguing that such tasks were
unfeasible for a computer.
Nowadays, it is obvious that the paper's predictions were very wrong. All
the tasks mentioned were much harder to accomplish than they claimed at the
time, and haven't been successfully completed even today. Rarely have such
plausible predictions turned out to be so wrong; so what can be learned from
this?
The most general lesson is perhaps on the complexity of language and the
danger of using human-understandable informal concepts in the eld of AI. The
Dartmouth group seemed convinced that because they informally understood
certain concepts and could begin to capture some of this understanding in a
formal model, then it must be possible to capture all this understanding in a
formal model. In this, they were wrong. Similarities of features do not make
the models similar to reality, and using human terms { such as `culture' and
subjective. It is not meant to suggest that the authors were thinking along these lines, merely
to point out factors that could explain their condence { factors, moreover, that could have
lead dispassionate analytical observers to agree with them.
20See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_computer.
21This is the principle that high-level reasoning requires very little computation, but low-
level sensorimotor skills require enormous computational resources { sometime informally
expressed as \everything easy [for a human] is hard [for a computer], everything hard is
easy".
15`informal' { in these model concealed huge complexity and gave an illusion of
understanding. Today's AI developers have a much better understanding of how
complex cognition can be, and have realised that programming simple-seeming
concepts into computers can be very dicult. So the main lesson to draw is
that reasoning about AI using human concepts (or anthropomorphising the AIs
by projecting human features onto it) is a very poor guide to the nature of the
problem and the time and eort required to solve it.
5.2 Dreyfus's Articial Alchemy
Classication: issues and metastatements, using the outside view, non-
expert judgement and philosophical arguments.
Hubert Dreyfus was a prominent early critic of Articial Intelligence. He
published a series of papers and books attacking the claims and assumptions
of the AI eld, starting in 1965 with a paper for the Rand corporation entitled
`Alchemy and AI' [Dre65]. The paper was famously combative, analogising AI
research to alchemy and ridiculing AI claims. Later, D. Crevier would claim
\time has proven the accuracy and perceptiveness of some of Dreyfus's com-
ments. Had he formulated them less aggressively, constructive actions they
suggested might have been taken much earlier" [Cre93]. Ignoring the formula-
tion issues, were Dreyfus's criticisms actually correct, and what can be learned
from them?
Was Dreyfus an expert? Though a reasonably prominent philosopher, there
is nothing in his background to suggest specic expertise with theories of minds
and consciousness, and absolutely nothing to suggest familiarity with articial
intelligence and the problems of the eld. Thus Dreyfus cannot be considered
anything more that an intelligent outsider.
This makes the pertinence and accuracy of his criticisms that much more
impressive. Dreyfus highlighted several over-optimistic claims for the power of
AI, predicting { correctly { that the 1965 optimism would also fade (with, for
instance, decent chess computers still a long way o). He used the outside
view to claim this as a near universal pattern in AI: initial successes, followed
by lofty claims, followed by unexpected diculties and subsequent disappoint-
ment. He highlighted the inherent ambiguity in human language and syntax,
and claimed that computers could not deal with these. He noted the importance
of unconscious processes in recognising objects, the importance of context and
the fact that humans and computers operated in very dierent ways. He also
criticised the use of computational paradigms for analysing human behaviour,
and claimed that philosophical ideas in linguistics and classication were rele-
vant to AI research. In all, his paper is full of interesting ideas and intelligent
deconstructions of how humans and machines operate.
All these are astoundingly prescient predictions for 1965, when computers
were in their infancy and their limitations were only beginning to be understood.
Moreover he was not only often right, but right for the right reasons (see for
instance his understanding of the diculties computer would have in dealing
with ambiguity). Not everything Dreyfus wrote was correct, however; apart
from minor specic points22, he erred most mostly by pushing his predictions
to extremes. He claimed that `the boundary may be near' in computer abilities,
22Such as his distrust of heuristics.
16and concluded with:
\...what can now be done? Nothing directly towards building ma-
chines which can be intelligent. [...] in the long run [we must think]
of non-digital automata..."
Currently, however, there exists `digital automata' that can beat all humans
at chess, translate most passages to at least an understandable level, and beat
humans at `Jeopardy', a linguistically ambiguous arena [Gui11]. He also failed
to foresee that workers in AI would eventually develop new methods to overcome
the problems he had outlined. Though Dreyfus would later state that he never
claimed AI achievements were impossible [McC04], there is no reason to pay
attention to later re-interpretations: Dreyfus's 1965 article strongly suggests
that AI progress was bounded. These failures are an illustration of the principle
that even the best of predictors is vulnerable to overcondence.
In 1965, people would have been justied to nd Dreyfus's analysis somewhat
implausible. It was the work of an outsider with no specic relevant expertise,
and dogmatically contradicted the opinion of genuine experts inside the AI
eld. Though the claims it made about human and machine cognition seemed
plausible, there is a great dierence between seeming plausible and actually
being correct, and his own non-expert judgement was the main backing for the
claims. Outside of logic, philosophy had yet to contribute much to the eld
of AI, so no intrinsic reason to listen to a philosopher. There were, however,
a few signs that the paper was of high quality: Dreyfus seemed to be very
knowledgeable about progress and work in AI, and most of his analyses on
human cognition were falsiable, at least to some extent. These were still not
strong arguments to heed the skeptical opinions of an outsider.
The subsequent partial vindication of the paper is therefore a stark warning:
it is very dicult to estimate the accuracy of outsider predictions. There were
many reasons to reject Dreyfus's predictions in 1965, and yet that would have
been the wrong thing to do. Blindly accepting non-expert outsider predictions
would have also been a mistake, however: these are most often in error (see
Section 3.4.2). One general lesson concerns the need to decrease certainty:
the computer scientists of 1965 should at least have accepted the possibility
(if not the plausibility) that some of Dreyfus's analysis was correct, and they
should have started paying more attention to the `success-excitement-diculties-
stalling' cycles in their eld to see if the pattern continued. A second lesson
could be about the importance of philosophy: it does seem that philosophers'
meta-analytical skills can contribute useful ideas to AI { a fact that is certainly
not self-evident (see also Section 5.5).
5.3 Locked up in Searle's Chinese room
Classication: issues and metastatements and a scenario, using philo-
sophical arguments and expert judgement.
Searle's Chinese room thought experiment is a famous critique of some of
the assumptions of `strong AI23'. There has been a lot of further discussion on
the subject (see for instance [Sea90, Har01]), but, as in previous case studies,
this section will focus exclusively on his original 1980 publication [Sea80].
23Which Searle denes as the belief that `the appropriately programmed computer literally
has cognitive states.'
17In the key thought experiment, Searle imagined that AI research had pro-
gressed to the point where a computer program had been created that could
demonstrate the same input-output performance as a human { for instance, it
could pass the Turing test. Nevertheless, Searle argued, this program would not
demonstrate true understanding. He supposed that the program's inputs and
outputs were in Chinese, a language Searle couldn't understand. Instead of a
standard computer program, the required instructions were given on paper, and
Searle himself was locked in a room somewhere, slavishly following the instruc-
tions and therefore causing the same input-output behaviour as the AI. Since
it was functionally equivalent to the AI, the setup should, from the `strong
AI' perspective, demonstrate understanding if and only if the AI did. Searle
then argued that there would be no understanding at all: he himself couldn't
understand Chinese, and there was no-one else in the room to understand it
either.
The whole argument depends on strong appeals to intuition (indeed D. Den-
net went as far as accusing it of being an `intuition pump' [Den91]). The required
assumptions are:
 The Chinese room setup analogy preserves the relevant properties of the
AI's program.
 Intuitive reasoning about the Chinese room is thus relevant reasoning
about algorithms.
 The intuition that the Chinese room follows a purely syntactic (symbol-
manipulating) process rather than a semantic (understanding) one is a
correct philosophical judgement.
 The intuitive belief that humans follow semantic processes is however cor-
rect.
Thus the Chinese room argument is unconvincing to those that don't share
Searle's intuitions. It cannot be accepted solely on Searle's philosophical exper-
tise, as other philosophers disagree [Den91, Rey86]. On top of this, Searle is very
clear that his thought experiment doesn't put any limits on the performance of
AIs (he argues that even a computer with all the behaviours of a human being
would not demonstrate true understanding). Hence the Chinese room seems to
be useless for AI predictions. Can useful prediction nevertheless be extracted
from it?
These need not come directly from the main thought experiment, but from
some of the intuitions and arguments surrounding it. Searle's paper presents
several interesting arguments, and it is interesting to note that many of them are
disconnected from his main point. For instance, errors made in 1980 AI research
should be irrelevant to the Chinese Room { a pure thought experiment. Yet
Searle argues about these errors, and there is at least an intuitive if not a logical
connection to his main point. There are actually several dierent arguments in
Searle's paper, not clearly divided from each other, and likely to be rejected or
embraced depending on the degree of overlap with Searle's intuitions. This may
explain why many philosophers have found Searle's paper so complex to grapple
with.
One feature Searle highlights is the syntactic-semantic gap. If he is correct,
and such a gap exists, this demonstrates the possibility of further philosophical
18progress in the area24. For instance, Searle directly criticises McCarthy's con-
tention that \Machines as simple as thermostats can have beliefs" [McC79]. If
one accepted Searle's intuition there, one could then ask whether more compli-
cated machines could have beliefs, and what attributes they would need. These
should be attributes that it would be useful to have in an AI. Thus progress in
`understanding understanding' would likely make it easier to go about designing
AI { but only if Searle's intuition is correct that AI designers do not currently
grasp these concepts.
That can be expanded into a more general point. In Searle's time, the
dominant AI paradigm was GOFAI (Good Old-Fashioned Articial Intelligence
[Hau85]), which focused on logic and symbolic manipulation. Many of these
symbols had suggestive labels: SHRDLU, for instance, had a vocabulary that
included `red', `block', `big' and `pick up' [Win71]. Searle's argument can be
read, in part, as a claim that these suggestive labels did not in themselves impart
true understanding of the concepts involved { SHRDLU could parse \pick up
a big red block" and respond with an action that seems appropriate, but could
not understand those concepts in a more general environment. The decline of
GOFAI since the 1980's cannot be claimed as vindication of Searle's approach,
but it at least backs up his intuition that these early AI designers were missing
something.
Another falsiable prediction can be extracted, not from the article but from
the intuitions supporting it. If formal machines do not demonstrate understand-
ing, but brains (or brain-like structures) do, this would lead to certain scenario
predictions. Suppose two teams were competing to complete an AI that will
pass the Turing test. One team was using standard programming techniques on
computer, the other were building it out of brain (or brain-like) components.
Apart from this, there is no reason to prefer one team over the other.
According to Searle's intuition, any AI made by the rst project will not
demonstrate true understanding, while those of the second project may. Adding
the reasonable assumption that it is easier to harder to simulate understanding
if one doesn't actually possess it, one is lead to the prediction that the second
team is more likely to succeed.
Thus there are three predictions that can be extracted from the Chinese
room paper:
1. Philosophical progress in understanding the syntactic-semantic gap may
help towards designing better AIs.
2. GOFAI's proponents incorrectly misattribute understanding and other
high level concepts to simple symbolic manipulation machines, and will
not succeed with their approach.
3. An AI project that uses brain-like components is more likely to succeed
(everything else being equal) than one based on copying the functional
properties of the mind.
Therefore one can often extract predictions from even the most explicitly
anti-predictive philosophy of AI paper. The rst two predictions turned out to
24In the opinion of one of the authors, the gap can be explained by positing that humans
are purely syntactic beings, but that have been selected by evolution such that human mental
symbols correspond with real world objects and concepts { one possible explanation among
very many.
19be correct (the move away from GOFAI being the proof of this), while the third
is too early to judge.
5.4 How well have the \Spiritual Machines" aged?
Classication: timelines and scenarios, using expert judgement, causal
models, non-causal models and (indirect) philosophical arguments.
Ray Kurzweil is a prominent and often quoted AI predictor. One of his
most important books was the 1999 \The Age of Spiritual Machines" which
presented his futurist ideas in more detail, and made several predictions for the
years 2009, 2019, 2029 and 2099. That book will be the focus of this case study,
ignoring his more recent work25. There are ve main points relevant to judging
\The Age of Spiritual Machines": Kurzweil's expertise, his `Law of Accelerating
Returns', his extension of Moore's law, his predictive track record, and his use
of ctional imagery to argue philosophical points.
Kurzweil has had a lot of experience in the modern computer industry. He's
an inventor, computer engineer, and entrepreneur, and as such can claim insider
experience in the development of new computer technology. He has been directly
involved in narrow AI projects covering voice recognition, text recognition and
electronic trading. His fame and prominence are further indications of the allure
(though not necessarily the accuracy) of his ideas. In total, Kurzweil can be
regarded as an AI expert.
Kurzweil is not, however, a cosmologist or an evolutionary biologist. In his
book, he proposed a `Law of Accelerating Returns'. This law claimed to explain
many disparate phenomena, such as the speed and trends of evolution of life
forms, the evolution of technology, the creation of computers, and Moore's law
in computing. His slightly more general 'Law of Time and Chaos' extended his
model to explain the history of the universe or the development of an organism.
It is a causal model, as it aims to explain these phenomena, not simply note
the trends. Hence it is a timeline prediction, based on a causal model that
makes use of the outside view to group the categories together, and is backed
by non-expert opinion.
A literature search failed to nd any evolutionary biologist or cosmologist
stating their agreement with these laws. Indeed there has been little academic
work on them at all, and what work there is tends to be critical26.
The laws are ideal candidates for counterfactual resiliency checks, however.
It is not hard to create counterfactuals that shift the timelines underlying the
laws27. Many standard phenomena could have delayed the evolution of life on
Earth for millions or billions of years (meteor impacts, solar energy uctuations
or nearby gamma-ray bursts). The evolution of technology can similarly be
accelerated or slowed down by changes in human society and in the availability of
raw materials { it is perfectly conceivable that, for instance, the ancient Greeks
could have started a small industrial revolution, or that the European nations
could have collapsed before the Renaissance due to a second and more virulent
25A correct prediction in 1999 for 2009 is much more impressive than a correct 2008 rein-
terpretation or clarication of that prediction.
26See for instance `Kurzweil's Turing Fallacy' by Thomas Ray of the Department of Zoology
at the University of Oklahoma http://life.ou.edu/pubs/kurzweil/.
27A more detailed version of this counterfactual resiliency check can be found at http:
//lesswrong.com/lw/ea8/counterfactual_resiliency_test_for_noncausal.
20Black Death (or even a slightly dierent political structure in Italy). Population
fragmentation and decrease can lead to technology loss (such as the `Tasmanian
technology trap' [Riv12]). Hence accepting that a Law of Accelerating Returns
determines the pace of technological and evolutionary change, means rejecting
many generally accepted theories of planetary dynamics, evolution and societal
development. Since Kurzweil is the non-expert here, his law is almost certainly
in error, and best seen as a literary device rather than a valid scientic theory.
If the Law is restricted to being a non-causal model of current computational
development, then the picture is very dierent. Firstly because this is much
closer to Kurzweil's domain of expertise. Secondly because it is now much more
robust to counterfactual resiliency. Just as in the analysis of Moore's law in
Section 3.2.1, there are few plausible counterfactuals in which humanity had
continued as a technological civilization for the last fty years, but computing
hadn't followed various exponential curves. Moore's law has been maintained
across transitions to new and dierent substrates, from transistors to GPUs, so
knocking away any given technology or idea seems unlikely to derail it. There
is no consensus as to why Moore's law actually works, which is another reason
it's so hard to break, even counterfactually.
Moore's law and its analogues [Moo65, Wal05] are non-causal models, backed
up strongly by the data and resilient to reasonable counterfactuals. Kurzweil's
predictions are mainly based around grouping these laws together (outside view)
and projecting them forwards into the future. This is combined with Kurzweil's
claims that he can estimate how those continuing technological innovations are
going to become integrated into society. These timeline predictions are thus
based strongly on Kurzweil's expert judgement. But much better than sub-
jective impressions of expertise, is Kurzweil's track record: his predictions for
2009. This gives empirical evidence as to his predictive quality.
Initial assessments suggested that Kurzweil had a success rate around 50%28.
A panel of nine volunteers were recruited to give independent assessments of
Kurzweil's performance. Kurzweil's predictions were broken into 172 individual
statements, and the volunteers were given a randomised list of numbers from 1 to
172, with instructions to work their way down the list in that order, estimating
each prediction as best they could. Since 2009 was obviously a `ten year from
1999' gimmick, there was some exibility on the date: a prediction was judged
true if it was true by 201129.
531 assessments were made, an average of exactly 59 assessments per vol-
unteer. Each volunteer assessed at least 10 predictions, while one volunteer
assessed all 172. Of the assessments, 146 (27%) were found to be true, 82 (15%)
weakly true, 73 (14%) weakly false, 172 (32%) false, and 58 (11%) could not
be classied (see Figure 3) (the results are little changed ( 1%) if the re-
sults are calculated for each volunteer, and then averaged). Simultaneously, a
separate assessment was made using volunteers on the site Youtopia. These
found a much higher failure rate { 41% false, 16% weakly false { but since the
experiment wasn't blinded or randomised, it is of less rigour30.
28See http://lesswrong.com/lw/diz/kurzweils_predictions_good_accuracy_poor/.
29Exact details of the assessment instructions and the results can be found here: http:
//lesswrong.com/r/discussion/lw/gbh/assessing_kurzweil_the_gory_details/. Empha-
sis was placed on the fact that the predictions had to be useful to a person in 1999 planning
their future, not simply impressive to a person in 2009 looking back at the past
30See http://lesswrong.com/lw/gbi/assessing_kurzweil_the_results/
21Figure 3: Assessments of the correctness of Kurzweil's predictions: percentage
of assessments in each category from true to false.
These nine volunteers thus found a correct prediction rate of 42%. How
impressive this result is depends on how specic and unobvious Kurzweil's pre-
dictions were. This is very dicult to gure out, especially in hindsight [Fis75].
Nevertheless, a subjective overview suggests that the predictions were often
quite specic (e.g. \Unused computes on the Internet are being harvested, cre-
ating virtual parallel supercomputers with human brain hardware capacity"),
and sometimes failed because of this. In view of this, a correctness rating of 42%
is impressive, and goes some way to demonstrate Kurzweil's predictive abilities.
When it comes to self-assessment31, however, Kurzweil is much less impres-
sive. He commissioned investigations into his own performance, which gave
him scores of 102 out of 10832 or 127 out of 14733, with the caveat that \even
the predictions that were considered wrong [...] were not all wrong." This is
dramatically dierent from this paper's assessments.
What can be deduced from this tension between good performance and poor
self-assessment? The performance is a validation of Kurzweil's main model:
continuing exponential trends in computer technology, and conrmation that
Kurzweil has some impressive ability to project how these trends will impact
the world. However, it does not vindicate Kurzweil as a predictor per se { his
self-assessment implies that he does not make good use of feedback. Thus one
should probably pay more attention to Kurzweil's model, than to his subjective
judgement. This is a common nding in expert tasks { experts are often better at
constructing predictive models than at making predictions themselves [Kah11].
`The Age of Spiritual Machines' is not simply a dry tome, listing predictions
and arguments. It is also, to a large extent, a story, which includes a conversa-
tion with a hypothetical future human called Molly discussing her experiences
through the coming century and its changes. Can one extract veriable predic-
31Commissioned assessments must also be taken as self-assessments, unless there are strong
reasons to suppose independence of the assessor.
32See Ray Kurzweil response's response to http://www.acceleratingfuture.com/michael/
blog/2010/01/kurzweils-2009-predictions.
33See http://www.forbes.com/sites/alexknapp/2012/03/21/
ray-kurzweil-defends-his-2009-predictions.
22tions from this aspect of the book (see Section 3.1)?
A story is neither a prediction nor evidence for some particular future. But
the reactions of characters in the story can be construed as a scenario prediction.
They imply that real humans, placed in those hypothetical situations, will react
in the way described. Kurzweil's story ultimate ends with humans merging with
machines { with the barrier between human intelligence and articial intelligence
being erased. Along the way, he describes the interactions between humans and
machines, imagining the machines quite dierent from humans, but still being
perceived to have human feelings.
One can extract two falsiable future predictions from this: rst, that hu-
mans will perceive feelings in AIs, even if they are not human-like. Secondly,
that humans and AIs will be able to relate to each other socially over the long
term, despite being quite dierent, and that this social interaction will form
the main glue keeping the mixed society together. The rst prediction seems
quite solid: humans have anthropomorphised trees, clouds, rock formations and
storms, and have become convinced that chatterbots were sentient [Wei66]. The
second prediction is more controversial: it has been argued that an AI will be
such an alien mind that social pressures and structures designed for humans will
be completely unsuited to controlling it [Bos12, Arm13, ASB12]. Determining
whether social structures can control dangerous AI behaviour, as it controls dan-
gerous human behaviour, is a very important factor in deciding whether AIs will
ultimately be safe or dangerous. Hence analysing this story-based prediction is
an important area of future research.
5.5 What drives an AI?
Classication: issues and metastatements, using philosophical arguments
and expert judgement.
Steve Omohundro, in his paper on `AI drives', presented arguments aiming
to show that generic AI designs would develop `drives' that would cause them to
behave in specic and potentially dangerous ways, even if these drives were not
programmed in initially [Omo08]. One of his examples was a superintelligent
chess computer that was programmed purely to perform well at chess, but that
was nevertheless driven by that goal to self-improve, to replace its goal with a
utility function, to defend this utility function, to protect itself, and ultimately
to acquire more resources and power.
This is a metastatement: generic AI designs would have this unexpected and
convergent behaviour. This relies on philosophical and mathematical arguments,
and though the author has expertise in mathematics and machine learning, he
has none directly in philosophy. It also makes implicit use of the outside view:
utility maximising agents are grouped together into one category and similar
types of behaviours are expected from all agents in this category.
In order to clarify and reveal assumptions, it helps to divide Omohundro's
thesis into two claims. The weaker one is that a generic AI design could end up
having these AI drives; the stronger one that it would very likely have them.
Omohundro's paper provides strong evidence for the weak claim. It demon-
strates how an AI motivated only to achieve a particular goal, could nevertheless
improve itself, become a utility maximising agent, reach out for resources and
so on. Every step of the way, the AI becomes better at achieving its goal, so
all these changes are consistent with its initial programming. This behaviour
23is very generic: only specically tailored or unusual goals would safely preclude
such drives.
The claim that AIs generically would have these drives needs more assump-
tions. There are no counterfactual resiliency tests for philosophical arguments,
but something similar can be attempted: one can use humans as potential coun-
terexamples to the thesis. It has been argued that AIs could have any motivation
a human has [Arm13, Bos12]. Thus according to the thesis, it would seem that
humans should be subject to the same drives and behaviours. This does not
t the evidence, however. Humans are certainly not expected utility maximis-
ers (probably the closest would be nancial traders who try to approximate
expected money maximisers, but only in their professional work), they don't
often try to improve their rationality (in fact some specically avoid doing so34,
and some sacrice cognitive ability to other pleasures[BBJ+03]), and many turn
their backs on high-powered careers. Some humans do desire self-improvement
(in the sense of the paper), and Omohundro cites this as evidence for his the-
sis. Some humans don't desire it, though, and this should be taken as contrary
evidence35. Thus one hidden assumption of the model is:
 Generic superintelligent AIs would have dierent motivations to a signi-
cant subset of the human race, OR
 Generic humans raised to superintelligence would develop AI drives.
This position is potentially plausible, but no real evidence is presented for it in
the paper.
A key assumption of Omohundro is that AIs will seek to re-express their
goals in terms of a utility function. This is based on the Morgenstern-von
Neumann expected utility theorem [vNM44]. The theorem demonstrates that
any decision process that cannot be expressed as expected utility maximising,
will be exploitable by other agents or by the environments. Hence in certain
circumstances, the agent will predictably lose assets, to no advantage to itself.
That theorem does not directly imply, however, that the AI will be driven
to become an expected utility maximiser (to become \rational"). First of all, as
Omohundro himself points out, real agents can only be approximately rational:
fully calculating the expected utility of every action is too computationally
expensive in the real world. Bounded rationality [Sim55] is therefore the best
that can be achieved, and the benets of becoming rational can only be partially
realised.
Secondly, there are disadvantages to becoming rational: these agents tend to
be \totalitarian", ruthlessly squeezing out anything not explicitly in their utility
function, sacricing everything to the smallest increase in expected utility. An
agent that didn't start o as utility-based could plausibly make the assessment
that becoming so might be dangerous. It could stand to lose values irrevocably,
in ways that it could not estimate at the time. This eect would become stronger
as its future self continues to self-improve. Thus an agent could conclude that
it is too dangerous to become \rational", especially if the agent's understanding
of itself is limited.
34Many examples of this are religious, such as the Puritan John Cotton who wrote `the
more learned and witty you bee, the more t to act for Satan will you bee'[Hof62].
35Or as evidence that Omohundro's model of what constitutes self-improvement is overly
narrow.
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it will be much exploited in practice. Humans are relatively adept at not being
exploited, despite not being rational agents. Though human `partial rationality'
is vulnerable to tricks such as extended warranties and marketing gimmicks, it
generally doesn't end up losing money, again and again and again, through
repeated blatant exploitation. The pressure to become fully rational would be
weak for an AI similarly capable of ensuring it was exploitable for only small
amounts. An expected utility maximiser would nd such small avoidable loses
intolerable; but there is no reason for a not-yet-rational agent to agree.
Finally, social pressure should be considered. The case for an AI becom-
ing more rational is at its strongest in a competitive environment, where the
theoretical exploitability is likely to actually be exploited. Conversely, there
may be situations of social equilibriums, with dierent agents all agreeing to
forgo rationality individually, in the interest of group cohesion (there are many
scenarios where this could be plausible).
Thus another hidden assumption of the strong version of the thesis is:
 The advantages of becoming less-exploitable outweigh the possible disad-
vantages of becoming an expected utility maximiser (such as possible loss
of value or social disagreements). The advantages are especially large when
the potentially exploitable aspects of the agent are likely to be exploited,
such as in a highly competitive environment.
Any sequence of decisions can be explained as maximising a (potentially very
complicated or obscure) utility function. Thus in the abstract sense, saying that
an agent is an expected utility maximiser is not informative. Yet there is a strong
tendency to assume such agents will behave in certain ways (see for instance the
previous comment on the totalitarian aspects of expected utility maximisation).
This assumption is key to rest of the thesis. It is plausible that most agents
will be `driven' towards gaining extra power and resources, but this is only a
problem if they do so dangerously (at the cost of human lives, for instance).
Assuming that a realistic utility function based agent would do so is plausible
but unproven.
In general, generic statements about utility function based agents are only
true for agents with relatively simple goals. Since human morality is likely very
complicated to encode in a computer, and since most putative AI goals are very
simple, this is a relatively justied assumption but is an assumption nonetheless.
So there are two more hidden assumptions:
 Realistic AI agents with utility functions will be in a category such that
one can make meaningful, generic claims for (almost) all of them. This
could arise, for instance, if their utility function is expected to be simpler
that human morality.
 Realistic AI agents are likely not only to have the AI drives Omohundro
mentioned, but to have them in a very strong way, being willing to sacrice
anything else to their goals. This could happen, for instance, if the AIs
were utility function based with relatively simple utility functions.
This simple analysis suggests that a weak form of Omohundro's thesis is
nearly certainly true: AI drives could emerge in generic AIs. The stronger
25thesis, claiming that the drives would be very likely to emerge, depends on
some extra assumptions that need to be analysed.
But there is another way of interpreting Omohundro's work: it presents the
generic behaviour of simplied articial agents (similar to the way that supply
and demand curves present the generic behaviour of simplied human agents).
Thus even if the model is wrong, it can still be of great use for predicting AI
behaviour: designers and philosophers could explain how and why particular AI
designs would deviate from this simplied model, and thus analyse whether that
AI is likely to be safer than that in the Omohundro model. Hence the model is
likely to be of great use, even if it turns out to be an idealised simplication.
5.5.1 Dangerous AIs and the failure of counterexamples
Another thesis, quite similar to Omohundro's, is that generic AIs would behave
dangerously, unless they were exceptionally well programmed. This point has
been made repeatedly by Roman Yampolskiy, Eliezer Yudkowsky and Marvin
Minsky, among others [Yam12, Yud08, Min84]. That thesis divides in the same
fashion as Omohundro's: a weaker claim that any AI could behave dangerously,
and a stronger claim that it would likely do so. The same analysis applies
as for the `AI drives': the weak claim is solid, the stronger claim needs extra
assumptions (but describes a useful `simplied agent' model of AI behaviour).
There is another source of evidence for both these theses: the inability of
critics to eectively dismiss them. There are many counter-proposals to the
theses (some given in question and answer sessions at conferences) in which
critics have presented ideas that would `easily' dispose of the dangers 36; ev-
ery time, the authors of the theses have been able to point out aws in the
counter-proposals. This demonstrated that the critics had not grappled with
the fundamental issues at hand, or at least not suciently to weaken the theses.
This should obviously not be taken as a proof of the theses. But it does
show that the arguments are currently dicult to counter. Informally this is a
reverse expert-opinion test: if experts often nd false counter-arguments, then
then any given counter-argument is likely to be false (especially if it seems
obvious and easy). Thus any counter-argument should have been subject to a
degree of public scrutiny and analysis, before it can be accepted as genuinely
undermining the theses. Until that time, both predictions seem solid enough
that any AI designer would do well to keep them in mind in the course of their
programming.
6 Conclusion
The aims of this paper and the previous one [AS12] were to analyse how AI
predictions were made, and to start constructing a toolbox of methods that
would allow people to construct testable predictions from most AI-related pub-
lications, and assess the reliability of these predictions. It demonstrated the
problems with expert judgement, in theory and in practice. Timeline predic-
tions were seen to be particularly unreliable: in general, these should be seen
36See for instance http://lesswrong.com/lw/cbs/thoughts_on_the_singularity_
institute_si/ and http://becominggaia.files.wordpress.com/2010/06/agi-11-waser.
pdf.
26as containing little useful information.
The various tools and analyses were applied in case studies to ve famous
AI predictions, the original Dartmouth conference, Dreyfus's criticism of AI,
Searle's Chinese Room thought experiment, Kurzweil's 1999 predictions, and
Omohundro's `AI drives' argument. This demonstrated the great diculty of
assessing the reliability of AI predictions at the time they are made: by any
reasonable measures, the Dartmouth conference should have been expected to
be more accurate than Dreyfus. The reality, of course, was completely opposite.
Though there are some useful tools for assessing prediction quality, and they
should denitely be used, they provide only weak evidence. The only consistent
message was all predictors were overcondent in their verdicts, and that model-
based predictions were superior to those founded solely on expert intuition.
It is hoped that future predictors (and future predictor assessors) will follow
in the spirit of these examples, and make their assumptions explicit, their mod-
els clear, their predictions testable, and their uncertainty greater. This is not
limited to statements about AI { there are many elds where the `toolbox' of
methods described here could be used to analyse and improve their predictions.
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